Introduction
In most countries, public expenditure on education accounts for a large proportion of total expenditure on education. For the OECD countries, an average of 87% of expenditure on all levels of education came from public sources in 2004.
1 Public in- tervention is present at all educational levels, from pre-primary to tertiary education.
However, countries di¤er dramatically according to how they allocate resources across the di¤erent educational levels. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show data on yearly per student expenditure at basic and tertiary education, respectively. 2 In Column 3 we compute the ratio between expenditure per student in tertiary education and in basic education. We observe a large heterogeneity. The ratio ranges from 1.00 in Italy to 3.23 in Mexico, with an average for the OECD of 1.68. Columns 4 and 5 show the change in annual expenditure per student from 1995 to 2004 and the ratio between both indexes is reported in Column 6. Fifteen countries out of twenty one have a ratio lower than one, meaning that in this period they have diverted resources from tertiary to basic education, at least in relative terms.
Since Table 1 refers only to annual expenditure, we present some additional evidence in Table 2 . Here we show data compiled by the OECD on cumulative expenditure at basic and tertiary education, taking into account the duration of each educational level. Again we observe large di¤erences across countries. In Column 3
we compute the ratio between cumulative expenditure at both levels and we see that it ranges from 0.36 in Korea and New Zealand to 0.98 in The Netherlands.
1 See Table B3 .1, Education at a Glance 2007, OECD. 2 Basic education corresponds to primary, secondary, and post-secondary non-tertiary education. b Annual expenditure per student in US dollars, using PPPs.
c Index of change in annual expenditure per student, setting expenditure in 1995 at 100. Tables 1 and 2 document the existence of large di¤erences in educational policies across countries. One possible explanation is that each country has di¤erent objectives. 3 In fact, the role of education is at the heart of current and quite diverse debates, such as poverty reduction or the challenge of new technologies. A crucial question when analyzing public intervention is to establish the objectives of educational policies. Most governments care for e¢ ciency and equity issues in a wide sense. However, sometimes the problem is to give a precise meaning to these general principles. To circumvent this problem we propose that equity concerns imply that the objective of the government should be to facilitate everybody the access to education, irrespective of family background. Regarding e¢ ciency we propose two alternative objectives. The …rst objective consists of maximizing the productivity of college students, while the second one is to maximize the average productivity of the whole population. 4 We study how these two objectives relate to each other and then we analyze which policies should implement the government to achieve e¢ ciency and equity at the same time. In particular, we want to study whether both objectives are compatible or not and, if they are, which policies makes them compatible. Second, we explore whether all countries, rich and poor, should apply the same policy to satisfy these two objectives or if the policy reform is country-speci…c.
To study these issues, and in line with the data in Tables 1 and 2 , we build a model with two educational stages: basic and college education. Basic education comprises all mandatory levels of education and we assume it is fully …nanced by the government. In contrast, college education is voluntary and students may have to pay a part of the cost. Another di¤erence is that expenditure on basic education a¤ects the quality of education, but not enrollment, since attendance is mandatory. On the other hand, expenditure on college education a¤ects not only quality, but also enrollment. Individuals who go to college get a skilled job, while the rest remain unskilled. Due to capital markets imperfections, some individuals su¤er from borrowing constraints.
In our model, any public policy is characterized by two variables corresponding to expenditure on basic and college education, respectively. We de…ne the Equity-E¢ ciency frontier (EEF) as the set of public policies for which it is not possible to improve the two objectives of the government at the same time. The idea is similar to that of the Pareto set in an Edgeworth Box. In general, except by chance, we should not expect the economy to be at the EEF. Then, it is interesting to study if there is always a policy reform that simultaneously satis…es the objectives of equity and e¢ ciency, where e¢ ciency means to maximize the average productivity of college graduates. We prove that this is always the case. We also …nd that for rich countries, this policy consists precisely of transferring resources from college education to basic education. The intuition is that this policy reduces the threshold level of income needed to attend college, but at the price of raising the threshold level of ability. Since higher education is heavily subsidized in most of the rich countries, the …rst e¤ect is smaller in size and attendance reduces. However, due to the increase in the threshold level of ability the productivity of skilled workers rises. In addition, this policy has a positive e¤ect on the productivity and the number of unskilled workers. We also …nd that by transferring resources from college to basic education the average productivity across the population as a whole rises. For low income countries, n the contrary, the policy reform that has a positive e¤ect on equity and at the same time improves the productivity of skilled workers consists of transferring resources from basic to college education. However, in general we …nd that this policy will have a negative e¤ect on the average productivity across the population.
Note that we focus on educational reforms, instead of focusing on the design of an optimal educational policy. We start from a given division of the budget between the two levels of education and we study the e¤ect of diverting resources from one educational level to the other. We believe that this is a sensible approach since most governments, instead of introducing large reforms, introduce small reforms in several steps. 5 We discuss brie ‡y some previous works related to ours. Lloyd-Ellis (2000) studies the impact of alternative allocations of public resources between basic and higher education on enrollment, income distribution and growth, while Blankenau, Cassou and Ingram (2007) investigate its output and welfare implications. However, none of them consider individual heterogeneity with respect to family background, which is one of our main focuses. Driskill and Horowitz (2002) study optimal investment in human capital in a standard growth model, and they …nd that developing countries should concentrate on advanced human capital, a result similar to ours. Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) focus on intergenerational mobility and …nd that an increase in expenditure on early education has more impact than an increase in college subsidies. Su (2004) studies the dynamic e¤ects of allocating public funds between basic and college education. However, she abstracts from private education expenditure which is a crucial factor a¤ecting education outcomes. Finally, Romero (2008) considers that voters decide how to split the budget between basic and college education and he studies how the possibility of opting out from public education a¤ects that decision.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the economy. In Section 3 we consider the e¤ect of public policies on the di¤erent objectives of the government and we illustrate our main result with numerical examples. Finally, Section 4 concludes.
Model

Individuals and Educational Sector
We build a model with two periods. In the …rst period there is a continuum of individuals characterized by income y 2 [0; Y ] and innate ability a 2 [0; A]; where Y; A > 0: The respective cumulative distribution functions are F (y) and G(a); although to get closed-form solutions we will assume that a is uniformly distributed on its support. We also assume that y and a are independently distributed. 6 In the …rst part of the …rst period all children attend basic education, which is compulsory. In the second and last part of the …rst period, individuals can either get a job as unskilled workers or, alternatively, they can enrol in higher education to become skilled workers. We call the fraction of time of the …rst period spent at college and, thus, out of the labor force, where 0 < < 1:
In the second period, those individuals who attended college in the …rst period get a skilled job, while those who did not remain in an unskilled job. Individuals care for their consumption in the second period (C) which is equal to the value of their lifetime income.
We assume a simple structure for the educational sector. The per capita cost of providing basic education is denoted as c L > 0. Since basic education is compulsory, we assume that its cost is paid in full by the government. 7 Regarding higher education we want to separate public provision from public …nancing. The level of public provision is captured by c H > 0; which is the per capita cost of providing higher education. This includes wages paid to teachers, the cost of college equipment, laboratories, etc. The level of public …nancing of higher education is captured by s; which represents the proportion of the total cost that the government subsidizes. That is, the government pays c H s; while college students pay c H (1 s); with 0 s 1. To simplify things, we assume that the subsidy is the same for all individuals. We de…ne as = c H =c L the ratio between both costs. 8 We want to distinguish between public provision and public …nancing as each one of them can be used by the government to achieve di¤erent objectives. The parameter c H , as well as c L in the case of basic education, captures the quality of education. Increasing c H could be seen as a way of improving the quality of college education which, in turn, may have a positive e¤ect on the human capital of college graduates. 6 As we will see below, college attendance is the proportion of individuals with ability and income above some given thresholds. The assumption that a and y are independently distributed allows us to study separately the e¤ect of policy changes on college attendance through the e¤ect on the two thresholds. 7 In 2003, only 7.4% of total expenditure in basic education in the OECD (primary, secondary and post-secondary non-tertiary education) was privately …nanced. 8 As in Blankeneau et al (2007) and Lloyd-Ellis (2000) we do not consider the existence of …xed costs. One reason is of tractability. Another reason is that we are interested only in marginal changes in per capita costs. However, for a …xed level of c H ; an increase in s can be seen as a way of easing access to college for individuals from low-income families.
College Attendance
Since individuals care only for their consumption in the second period C; their only concern will be to maximize lifetime income. Next we de…ne lifetime income for the two types of workers, unskilled and skilled.
An individual who only attends basic education will be an unskilled worker for all her remaining lifetime. We assume that her productivity and, thus, her wage w U will be determined exclusively by per capita expenditure at basic education c L : We write w U = w U (c L ); and we assume this function to be increasing and weakly concave. Since they work a fraction of the …rst period, they earn w U (c L ) and w U (c L ) in the …rst and second period, respectively. Their lifetime income is, therefore, (1 + )w U (c L ). If an individual goes to college she becomes a skilled worker. Her productivity and thus, her wage, rises to w S (c L ; c H ; a); where we assume this function is increasing and weakly concave with respect to the three arguments. Lifetime income of a skilled worker will be w S (c L ; c H ; a) c H (1 s). An individual will choose higher education if:
We assume that this condition always holds for those individuals with the highest ability A since, otherwise, nobody will choose a college education. In particular we require:
which means that, even when s = 0; the highest ability individual …nds always pro…table to attend college. Condition (1) will hold for those individuals with ability a above a threshold b a; with 0 b a < A; which is implicitly de…ned as:
The e¤ect of the di¤erent parameters on the threshold value b a is as follows. Clearly, has a positive e¤ect on b a while the e¤ect of s is negative. This means that the higher is s; the lower is the threshold b a: Some individuals that had decided previously not to attend college because of their low level of ability, now …nd attending college pro…table. The e¤ect of both c L and c H depend on the properties of the functions w S (c L ; c H ; a) and w U (c L ): For instance, the e¤ect of c L on b a will be positive as long as: "
where "
are the elasticities of w U and w S ; respectively with respect to c L . This would be the case if, for example, money spent on basic education a¤ects mainly the productivity of those who do not go to college. Finally, to see the e¤ect of c H on b a note that an increase in c H has two e¤ects on b a: There is a positive e¤ect on w S and a negative e¤ect on the cost of college c H (1 s): Which one of them will prevail will depend on the value of the subsidy s: In particular, we see that the e¤ect of c H on b a will be positive as long as:
is the elasticity of w S with respect to c H : This will not be the case if s is close to 1. In such a case, the e¤ect on the cost will be negligible and the e¤ect on w S will prevail, reducing b a. When s is small, the e¤ect on the cost will dominate, and the …nal e¤ect on b a will be to rise it.
However, individuals must also be able to a¤ord the tuition cost c H (1 s) to attend college. They can use their income y and they have also access to a loan from a bank. However, and due to capital market imperfections we assume that they can borrow only up to an amount c H (1 s); where 0 1. 10 The parameter captures the "quality" of capital markets. This borrowing constraint, an exogenous feature of the model, is assumed to be the same across individuals. 11 The two polar cases are = 0; which means complete impossibility of borrowing, and = 1 which means that capital markets are perfect. So, the higher is the better is the quality of capital markets. 12 To attend college, therefore, individuals must have pre-tax income satisfying:
Those with income above c H (1 s) do not need to ask for a loan. Those with income below (1 )c H (1 s) cannot a¤ord college. Finally, those with income between (1 )c H (1 s) and c H (1 s) need a loan to attend college. The proportion of individuals who can a¤ord college is the proportion of individuals with pre-tax income above b y; namely, 1 F (b y): When = 1 or s = 1; we get b y = 0 and the constraint is not binding for any individual. To simplify notation we call p = 1 F (b y); and in the sequel we assume that p > 0. The proportion of individuals attending college is the proportion of individuals who satisfy at the same time Conditions (1) and (6). Since y and a are independently distributed, we can write as:
10 Evidence by Cameron and Taber (2004) and others suggests that credit constraint are not important in determining college attendance. In Section 4 we discuss how the main results of the paper change by removing the assumption that credit constraints bind. 11 Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002) build a model with endogenous borrowing constraints. Individuals of heterogeneous abilities or those making di¤erent schooling choices face di¤erent borrowing constraints. We implicitly assume that banks cannot condition loans on ability, as they cannot observe it. 12 The parameter could be alternatively interpreted as a policy variable. Many countries are o¤ering students'loans to overcome this constraint. Then = 1 means that there is such a policy in place, while = 0 means a complete absence of it.
It is immediate to check that is increasing with and s. The derivative of with respect to c L will be negative if Condition (4) holds. Finally, we want to analyze the e¤ect of c H on : An increase in c H rises the tuition cost reducing p: At the same time, the e¤ect on the term (A b a) will depend on whether Condition (5) holds or not. If it holds, these two e¤ects go in opposite directions and the …nal e¤ect will depend on which of the two e¤ects prevail. If Condition (5) fails, the e¤ect of c H on will be unambiguously negative. However, we want to stress that these results are just partial derivatives, since we are not taking into account that the budget constraint of the government must hold (see Section 2.3 below).
The Government Budget Constraint
Here we study how the three instruments of the government (c L ; c H ; s) are related through the budget constraint. We de…ne total expenditure in education E as:
We call T the total …xed budget that government has to spend in education. 13 We assume that the government cannot run a de…cit. Then the budget constraint is:
For …xed values of c L and c H ; we call b s the value of the subsidy for which the constraint is satis…ed with equality. If E < T for all values of the subsidy, then we set b s = 1: In the next proposition we provide a simple condition that guarantees that b s exists and that it is unique. Proposition 1 Consider any combination (c L ; c H ) and assume that the …xed budget T satis…es that T > c L : Then, there is a unique value b s(c L ; c H ) 1 that satis…es the budget constraint.
Proof. When s = 0; we see that E = c L : Since is increasing with s; the function E is strictly increasing in s: We have two possibilities. Either E is always below T; in which case b s(c L ; c H ) = 1; or they cross at a value of the subsidy b s(c L ; c H ) strictly below 1.
The condition that T > c L is required since, otherwise, even when college education is not subsidized at all, the government would be running a de…cit. For given values of the parameters, the fact that the government has to satisfy the budget constraint implies that it has only two free policy instruments. We choose c L and c H as the two free parameters and we assume that the subsidy always adjusts to satisfy the constraint. Since we are interested in policy changes, we want to know what is the e¤ect of changes in c L and c H on b s(c L ; c H ): To do this we assume that the equilibrium is interior. In particular we de…ne b s(c L ; c H ) as the value that satis…es:
Computing the corresponding derivatives: will be negative if the terms in the numerator are positive. Consider …rst that college attendance is not a¤ected by either c L or c H : Then, it is clear that both derivatives are negative. That is, rising either c L or c H reduces the resources that can be used to subsidize higher education. However, college attendance can also be a¤ected negatively by the increase in c L or c H , reducing the absolute value in the numerator. Intuitively, the negative e¤ect on the subsidy is attenuated, since now fewer individuals receive it. What we do is to assume that the indirect e¤ect through is not that large so as to o¤set the initial negative e¤ect. We de…ne an "iso-subsidy" curve as the set of all combinations (c L ; c H ) giving rise to the same value of the subsidy b s. From Equations (10) and (11), the slope of an iso-subsidy is:
By Assumption 1, this slope is negative, implying that there is always a trade-o¤ between expenditure on basic education and expenditure on college education. Holding the subsidy …xed, if we increase one of them we have to reduce the other in order to keep the budget balanced. From Proposition 1 we also see that a …xed combination (c L ; c H ) corresponds to di¤erent values of the subsidy in two countries with di¤erent educational budget T . Using Equation (10) above, for a …xed (c L ; c H ); the equilibrium value of the subsidy in a rich country (one with a high T ) will be higher than in a less rich country. From Equations (7) and (9) we also obtain that the equilibrium value of college attendance will be also higher in the rich country than in the less rich country.
14 In the Appendix we discuss which are the conditions that need for this to be true. Basically we need to assume that the elasticities of with respect to both c L and c H are small in size. In Figure 1 above we illustrate our policy space. We represent in black (respectively, red) a rich (respectively, poor) country. The closer to the origin, the higher is the value of the subsidy. The curved lines in the bottom part of the …gure represent the combinations (c L ; c H ) for which Condition (2) holds. That is, below that line nobody attends college and expenditure E is constant at E = c L . Point A in the …gure corresponds to a higher subsidy in a rich country than in a poor country. In the example of the …gure the values of the subsidy are 0.85 and 0.6, respectively.
Finally we also see that for a …xed combination (c L ; c H ), the iso-subsidy curve b s(c L ; c H ) is ‡atter in a rich country rather than in a less rich country, provided that both " c H and " c L are of small size. 15 The intuition is simple. Consider a rich country where both b s and take high values. If the government rises c H this policy will have a large impact on expenditure because a lot of people are getting a substantial subsidy. If nothing else is done, the subsidy should be reduced in a large amount. To hold the subsidy …xed, a signi…cant reduction of c L is needed. In the less rich country, on the contrary, rising c H has a smaller e¤ect on expenditure, since few people attend college and the subsidy is low. The reduction needed in c L to keep the subsidy constant is smaller.
Policy Reforms
We want to analyze policy reforms from an initial situation described by a particular combination (c L ; c H ) through their e¤ects on di¤erent government objectives. As we discussed in the introduction, we assume that the government wants to ful…ll several objectives at the same time. In particular, the government has both e¢ ciency and equity concerns. Although we will be more precise below, by e¢ ciency we re- 15 See the Appendix.
fer to policies that improve the productivity of workers through investment in the educational process. By equity we mean policies that foster equality of opportunities.
Equity
We assume that one of the government objectives is equity, as measured by equality of opportunities. By this we mean the following. For a …xed value of innate ability a; the probability of attending college is determined exclusively by income y. If the government wants to maximize the probability of attending college for a given ability level a; its objective will be simply to reduce as much as possible the threshold level of income b y corresponding to that ability level. Since we are assuming that a and y are independently distributed, that threshold is constant across ability levels. Then, for any value of in Equation (6) 
which is negative. This means that, if we increase c H (respectively, c L ); to hold b y constant we have to reduce c L (respectively, c H ):
E¢ ciency
First, we consider that the e¢ ciency objective of the government consists of increasing the average productivity or the average human capital of college graduates. This would be the case if the government is particularly concerned with improving the productivity of skilled workers. Since an individual with ability a who attends college has productivity w S (c L ; c H ; a); the average productivity of graduates, denoted by Q S is:
An increase in either c L or c H has a positive e¤ect on Q S , which is assumed to be concave with respect to both c L and c H . There is a positive direct e¤ect through w S and also an indirect positive e¤ect because the threshold b a rises as well. In the space (c L ; c H ) we can de…ne an "iso-productivity" curve as the set of combinations (c L ; c H ) giving rise to the same level of Q S . From (14) the slope of an iso-productivity is:
Since both c L and c H have a positive impact on w S ; this slope is negative. If we reduce c H (respectively, c L ); to hold Q S constant we have to increase c L (respectively, c H ):
In Figures 2a and 2b below we represent the level curves of Q S (in blue), together with those of b y (in red). A second e¢ ciency objective consists of rising the average level of human capital of the entire cohort of individuals, and not only that of college graduates. Recall that a proportion 1 of the cohort has productivity w U (c L ); while those attending college have productivity w S (c L ; c H ; a): If we call Q T (c L ; c H ) the average productivity, we have:
since only a proportion p of those with ability above the threshold b a can a¤ord a college education. Using the de…nition of Q S above, we can also write Q T as:
where the …rst term captures the aggregate level of human capital of unskilled workers and the second term takes into account both the quantity and the quality of college graduates. The di¤erences with Q S above are that now we also care for the productivity of unskilled workers and for college attendance. In particular, consider a policy change that rises Q S by transferring resources from college education to basic education. If college attendance does not change, then Q T will rise as well. However, in general we should expect a change in college attendance. If college attendance gets lower, the term on the left ( (1 )w U (c L )) gets higher, while the term on the right ( Q S ) can either rise or diminish. In fact, this second e¤ect is always of a smaller size, meaning that any policy that transfers resources from college to basic education that has a positive e¤ect on Q S ; will also have a positive e¤ect on Q T : To see this, note that Q T is always a convex combination of w U (c L ) and Q S (c L ; c H ): In the policy space (c L ; c H ) the level curves of Q S have negative slope, while those of w U (c L ) are vertical lines. The level curves of Q T must have, therefore, a slope between the corresponding slopes of w U (c L ) and Q S (c L ; c H ):
In the next section we focus on our narrower de…nition of e¢ ciency, namely Q S . We focus on Q S for two reasons. First, the analysis is much simpler than with Q T . Second, given the current trend in most Western countries towards cutting expenditure in higher education, we are interested in studying when it is the case that the policy that makes equity and e¢ ciency compatible consists of rising c L and reducing c H . Thus, given the relationship between the indi¤erence curves of Q S and the other two concepts, if that policy has a positive e¤ect on equity and Q S , it will also have a positive e¤ect on Q T .
Equity and College Productivity
We assume that the government is concerned about equity and about the quality of college graduates. Our next objective is to …nd those combinations (c L ; c H ) that take the economy to the equity-e¢ ciency frontier. We de…ne those combinations as follows:
De…nition 2 The Equity-E¢ ciency Frontier (EEF) is the set of all combinations (c L ; c H ) such that, for a given threshold level of income b y; college productivity Q S is maximized.
When both Q S and b y are di¤erentiable and quasi-concave functions (i.e, the upper contour sets of both functions are always convex sets), the EEF can be easily characterized by the usual tangency condition. That is, the EEF is de…ned as the set of all combinations (c L ; c H ) such that:
17
For an illustration see Figures 2a and 2b , where points A and B belong to the EEF. The EEF represents all policy combinations such that the government cannot improve equity without hurting e¢ ciency, or the other way round. For example, a movement from A to B in Figure 2a or 2b increases e¢ ciency at the price of reducing equity.
Observe that, as long as Q S is quasi-concave, we do not need b y to be quasi-concave. It is enough to assume that for any combination (c L ; c H ); the upper contour set of Q S is a proper subset of the lower contour set of b y: In the Appendix we discuss the issue of quasi-concavity of Q S : We see that Q S will be quasi-concave under very mild assumptions.
Next we discuss the shape of the EEF in the policy space (c L ; c H ): This shape will depend on the corresponding shapes of both Q S and b y: One example is the case in which Q S is such that c L and c H are strong complements. Just for the purpose of illustration, consider the case Q S = minfc L ; c H g: Then, rising c H has no e¤ect on college productivity if at the same time we do not increase c L : Then, the shape of EEF will be as represented in Figure 2a . That is, its slope will be positive in the space (c L ; c H ): However, for other technologies the contract curve may have a di¤erent shape in the policy space (c L ; c H ): For example, if money spent at early stages has a deeper impact on college productivity than expenditure at later stages, the slope of the EEF will be negative as represented in Figure 2b . The reason is that in this case putting more resources into college education has hardly any e¤ect on productivity. The higher is Q S ; the more vertical become its level curves. Now, since the slope of EEF is negative, a policy change that increases c L and reduces c H along the EEF, will improve e¢ ciency at the price of reducing equity.
Finally, observe that there is no reason why a given economy should be actually choosing an educational policy on the curve EEF. It is easy to see that, if an economy is not at a policy combination on the EEF, there is no longer a trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency. The following corollary states this result.
Corollary 3 For all combinations that are not in the EEF: (i) There is always a policy that improves the two objectives of the government.
(ii) This policy always consists of transferring resources from college to basic education when the initial combination is to the right of the EEF or from basic to college education if it is to the left of the EEF.
Proof. It is immediate from (18) and Figures 2a and 2b.
Consider, for example, the point C in both Figure 2a and Figure 2b . If the government implements a policy reform in the direction of the green arrow, this policy has a positive e¤ect both on equity and e¢ ciency.
This corollary shows that, regardless of the shape of the EEF, the objectives of equity and productivity are always compatible if the initial combination (c L ; c H ) is not in the EEF, and it also provides a characterization of the direction of the policy reform. What is crucial, therefore, is to identify for a given initial situation which is the optimal policy change.
An illustration: Ability matters only at college
The above model is too general to derive policy recommendations. In the sequel, therefore, we focus our attention to a particular example. In particular, we propose the following functional forms for the productivity levels of unskilled and skilled workers:
where 0 1: The unskilled wage is determined exclusively by per capita expenditure at basic education. We also assume that the marginal productivity of c L does not depend on ability.
16 Attending college yields a positive premium that depends both on ability a and on expenditure at college c H .
17 Note also that the marginal productivity of expenditure at college is higher for individuals of high ability than for low-ability individuals. Finally we assume decreasing returns to expenditure at both levels.
Using Equations (3) and (19) above, the threshold b a becomes:
while productivity of college graduates, Q S ; can be written as:
In the previous section we saw that having the two objectives in mind, equity and e¢ ciency, imposes always a trade-o¤ between basic education and college education as long as the economy is not at a policy combination on the EEF. Here we obtain a condition that characterizes whether the country is to the right or to the left of the EEF. By identifying this condition we are able to provide a policy recommendation for any given initial combination c L and c H .
In the next proposition we show that the particular policy to pursue depends crucially on the values of the elasticities of b s(c L ; c H ) with respect to c L and c H :
and w S (c L ; c H ; a) are as in Equation (19). Moreover, suppose that the initial situation (c L ; c H ) corresponds to a situation that is not in the EEF. Then, the particular policy reform that has a positive e¤ect both on the productivity of college graduates Q S and on equity depends on the size of the elasticity of b s(c L ; c H ) with respect to c L : If this elasticity is small in absolute terms, the government should rise c L and reduce c H : If the elasticity is large in absolute terms, the government should rise c H and reduce c L .
Proof. The proof is very simple. We just have to compare the slopes of Q S and b y in the space (c L ; c H ); when w U (c L ) and w S (c L ; c H ; a) are as in Equation (19). The slope of b y comes from Equation (13) . Regarding the slope of Q S ; using (21) and (20) we get:
There are two possibilities: either the slope in Equation (22) is smaller than the slope in Equation (13) or it is the other way round. In the …rst case, the only possibility of achieving both objectives is by increasing c L while reducing c H : This is the situation of point C in Figure 3 below, where we represent in green all policies satisfying both objectives. In the second case, the way to achieve both objectives is by increasing c H while reducing c L : This is point D in the …gure. We then see that which one of these two cases prevails depends on the value of the elasticity of b s(c L ; c H ) with respect to c L : From Equations (13) and (22), we check that the …rst case will arise as long as:
This can be written as:
De…ning the elasticities of b s(c L ; c H ) with respect to c L and c H as "
; respectively, the expression above can be …nally simpli…ed as:
Condition (25) is more complicated than it seems, as it depends on b s and the elasticities " is bigger than 1. In this case, the condition will be true as long as the elasticity of the subsidy with respect to c L in absolute value is not much higher than the corresponding elasticity in absolute value with respect to c H : In particular, whenever both elasticities are of comparable size, the condition will be always ful…lled.
If we consider two countries, one rich and one poor, it seems that the condition is more likely to be ful…lled in the rich country. The reason is that in rich countries, college attendance is higher than in poor countries. Then, changes in c H will have a deeper impact on the subsidy relative to changes in c L in rich countries, rather than in poor ones. That is, the absolute size of " will be higher than in poor countries. Below we run some numerical simulations that seem to con…rm this intuition.
In Figure 3 point C represents a situation in which Condition (25) holds. This could be seen as the situation in many developed countries. As we move into higher values of both c L and c H ; the equilibrium level of the subsidy gets lower. At the same time, we …nd that the iso-equity lines become steeper relatively to the iso-productivity lines. This means that, as we move farther away from the origin, eventually Condition (25) will fail. This is represented as point D in Figure 3 . In addition, Proposition 4 shows that which is the policy reform for a given starting point (c L ; c H ) depends on whether the country is rich or poor. Figure 4 represents the policy reforms for two countries: one rich and one poor. In both cases, the dotted lines represent the iso-productivity curves. The rich country (in black) has an educational budget T: The poor country (in red) has educational budget T 0 < T: Thus, for a …xed combination (c L ; c H ); the subsidy in the rich country will be higher than in the poor country and the iso-productivity lines will be steeper than the iso-equity lines. The policy reform will consist of increasing c L . In the poor country, since the same combination (c L ; c H ) corresponds to a much lower subsidy, the optimal policy reform is just the opposite one. 21 Figure 4 : Optimal policy in a rich and a poor country Finally, we know that any policy that transfers resources from college education to basic education and that respects both equity and college productivity will have a positive e¤ect on Q T as well. What about when Condition (25) does not hold? We saw that a policy that transfers resources towards higher education improves equity and college productivity. However, this is done at the price of reducing the human capital of those who do not attend college, and this may have at the end a negative e¤ect on Q T : In fact, the only policy that both respects equity and has a positive e¤ect on Q T is the one that transfers resources towards basic education.
A Numerical Example: High Income vs Low Income Countries
Here we present a numerical example to illustrate Proposition 4. To do it we have to …nd reasonable values of our parameters. This exercise should not be taken as a full- ‡edged calibration exercise, since the model is too abstract to be calibrated properly.
We need values for ; ; ; A and T: Once we have this, for every combination (c L ; c H ) we can compute the equilibrium levels of the subsidy b s(c L ; c H ); college attendance and productivity. In Table 3 we present our choice of parameter values. Below 22 we describe brie ‡y our choices. The value that we choose for re ‡ects the fact that the working life of an unskilled worker is a 10% longer than that of a skilled worker. Since borrowing constraints are not very important for most OECD countries we think that a value of close to 1 should be appropriate. In particular, we choose = 0:75. To simplify our computations, we choose = 1, although we comment below how results change when we allow for strictly decreasing returns to public expenditure in education ( < 1).
Next we focus on A: The value of A determines the value of the college premium. In particular, the college premium is an increasing function of A. We de…ne the college premium for an individual with ability a as the ratio between net lifetime income attending and not attending college. Since a follows a Uniform distribution on [0; A]; the average college premium can be written:
To obtain a value for and s we use OECD data from Table 2 . Columns 1 and 2 correspond roughly to what we call in the paper c L and c H ; respectively. In Column 3 (T/B) we compute the ratio . Taking the mean values of and s for the OECD ( = 0:61; s = 0:782), if we choose A = 1 we obtain an average college premium of 1.17, which seems reasonable. Moreover, choosing A = 1 simpli…es our calculations to a great extent. Countries are classi…ed as rich or poor according to the value of the educational budget T . For each country in Table 2 we calculate T as follows. Using country data for c L , c H , subsidies for higher education (Column Subs.) and college attendance levels (C.Att.), we plug these numbers into Equation (9) to get a value for T . Next, we divide the countries into two groups, according to their values of T: In particular, we consider as poor countries those …ve in the …rst quartile, namely: Greece, Hungary, Mexico, Slovak Republic and Turkey. We consider as rich countries the rest of the OECD countries. The average values of T; c L ; and c H are (approximately) T = $40; 000; c L = $35; 000 and c H = $25; 000 for poor countries and T = $100; 000, c L = $70; 000 and c H = $40; 000 for the rich countries.
Once we have values for all our parameters, we can compute the equilibrium values of b s, p and corresponding to any given combination (c L ; c H ) for the two groups of countries.
18 Next, we can derive the shape of the EEF. To do this we start by …xing a particular value of c L : Then, we compute the value of c H that takes the economy to the EEF. In other words, we …nd the value of c H such that the slopes of Q S and b y coincide. Next, we repeat the process with a di¤erent value of c L : By moving c L through all its support, we can obtain the shape of the whole EEF.
What we obtain in our numerical example is that the slope of the EEF is negative. This means that for those combinations (c L ; c H ) to the left of the EEF curve, the policy reform to implement consists of rising c L and reducing c H : For those combinations to the right of the EEF curve, the optimal policy reform is just the opposite. This result is in line with the interpretation we gave to Condition (25) immediately after Proposition 4. In fact, we could think of the EEF curve as a way of separating those combinations (c L ; c H ) where the subsidy is too large and the condition holds (those to the left of the curve), from those where the subsidy is too low and the condition does not hold (those to the right of the curve). We also …nd that the position of the EEF depends on the value of the educational budget T . In particular, as we show in Figure 5 above, the EEF curve for rich countries (in black), is above the EEF curve for poor countries (in red). 19 Moreover, if we focus on the group of rich countries, we …nd that the region where Condition 18 For simplicity we assume that y follows a uniform distribution on [0; Y ]. Using the data in Table   2 for c L , c H and subsidies for higher education (Column Subs.) we compute a value of b a for each country. Using these values of b a and given the college attendance levels (C.Att.) we can obtain a value of p. we can also compute Y . 19 For both groups, we also obtain that the larger is ; the larger is the region in the space (c L ; c H )
where Condition (25) holds.
(25) fails (those combinations above the EEF curve) corresponds to extremely low values of college attendance. This allows us to conclude that the empirically relevant region for high income countries corresponds to the situation where Condition (25) holds. However, this is not the case for poor countries, which con…rms the result illustrated in Figure 4 . That is, as we move farther away from the origin, Condition (25) will eventually fail. Once we reach low enough values of the subsidy, the isoequity lines become steeper relatively to the iso-productivity lines. Thus, the policy reform for poor countries will eventually consist of increasing c H . This policy has the e¤ect of increasing the college subsidy so that a higher proportion of poor individuals can a¤ord college, which in turn implies an increase in college attendance. Although this reform reduces the quality of basic education and the ability threshold for college students, due to the increase in c H , the …nal quality of college students increases. Finally we allow for decreasing returns to public expenditure in education ( < 1) and in particular we repeat our calculations using a value = 0:9. We …nd that, the lower is ; the larger is the region in the space (c L ; c H ) where Condition (25) holds.
In particular, as we show in Figure 5 , the EEF curve for = 0:9 (in dotted line), is above the EEF curve for = 1 (in solid line). In other words, the lower the marginal return to public expenditure in education, the larger the increase in c L in order to reach the EEF curve.
To illustrate further our results in Corollary 3 and Proposition 4, we present in Table 4 an example of the e¤ects of two di¤erent policy changes on the di¤erent objectives of the government. We focus on the case of rich countries and we use the numbers from Table 2 We consider two alternative policies. In the …rst one we transfer resources from higher education to basic education while in the second one we do just the opposite.
In particular, in the second column we consider a 12% reduction in c H and a 3.4% increase in c L . New values are c L = $91; 000 and c H = $44; 000: Once all variables reach a new equilibrium, we …nd that the subsidy becomes lower. However, we observe that the proportion of individuals who can a¤ord college increases from 62.5% to 63.4% meaning that this policy has a positive e¤ect on equity. As we see in the table, it has also a positive e¤ect on both measures of productivity, but at the cost of a negative e¤ect on college attendance.
In the third column we consider a 2.27% reduction in c L and a 14% increase in c H . New values are c L = $86; 000 and c H = $57; 000: This policy has a positive impact on the subsidy. Regarding the di¤erent objectives of the government, we …nd a negative e¤ect on equity since the value of p reduces from 62.5% to 58.8%. There is also a positive e¤ect on the productivity of college students. However, the e¤ect on the average level of productivity across the population Q T is negative. As predicted by Proposition 3, moving resources towards higher education will have a negative e¤ect either on equity or on productivity. On top of this, as seen in the reduction on Q T ; the increase in Q S (the average productivity of college graduates) is not enough to compensate the reduction in the productivity of unskilled workers (c L ).
Conclusion and Discussion
The main result of this paper is that, except in the special case in which the economy is at the EEF curve, there is always a policy reform that increases the productivity of college graduates without excluding the talented poor from college. For most rich countries, this policy consists of transferring resources from college to basic education. In addition we …nd that this policy has always a positive e¤ect on the average level of human capital across the population.
Throughout the paper we have assumed that capital markets are imperfect ( < 1): Here we want to comment brie ‡y on the e¤ect of removing this assumption. If = 1; then equity is no longer a concern for the government since in that case all individuals can attend college, irrespective of family income. The trade-o¤ between equity and e¢ ciency disappears. One interesting implication is that, in this case, the government could …x a large value of both c L and c H ; such that s = 0 in order to achieve e¢ ciency. That is, if capital markets work perfectly college education should be privately …nanced.
There are many possible extensions of this work. One possibility would be to study other objectives to represent e¢ ciency. For example, we could assume that the government tries to increase average lifetime income within a cohort which implies rising average consumption of the cohort in period 2.
20 Thus, the main di¤erence with average human capital above is that now we are subtracting the monetary cost of higher education paid by students. We have some partial results regarding the e¤ects of policy reforms on this objective. In particular, we …nd that as long as the indirect e¤ect of changes in both c L and c H through s and is not very large, a policy consisting of transferring resources from college to basic education that has a positive e¤ect on Q S will also have a positive e¤ect on the average lifetime income within a cohort.
Another extension would be to relax the assumption that the two characteristics that de…ne individuals are independent. It is generally assumed that there is correlation between parents'ability and the ability of the child when, for example, IQ is taken as a measure of ability. As parents'income and parents'ability are also correlated, the two characteristics in our model will be positively correlated. However, if the two variables are correlated, the model becomes more complicated as the two terms that de…ne college attendance now cannot be separated. The outcome is that the ability threshold will be lower for rich individuals than for poor individuals. One possibility could be to rely on numerical simulations to see whether the results of the paper change.
We believe that our results are relevant for several recent debates in the literature on the economics of education. There is increasing evidence that shows the early emergence and persistence of gaps in cognitive and non-cognitive skills (see among others, Carneiro and Heckman (2003) ). This issue is of special concern as, according to recent evidence, family environments have deteriorated (Heckman and Masterov (2004) ). 21 Studies that highlight the importance of increasing expenditure in early childhood care in achieving both equity and e¢ ciency provide an interesting illustration since, obviously, at the current level of resources, the rise of expenditure at that level should be done at the expense of reducing expenditure in later educational levels (see Heckman (2006) ). 21 In the US, the percentage of children born into, or living in, "nontraditional" families has increased greatly in the last 30 years (about 25% of children are now born into single parent homes now). "Nontraditional" families include not only single-parent families but also families where the parents are not married. The evidence found by Heckman and Masterov (2004) suggests that children raised in these types of families fare worse in many aspects of social and economic life. . We see that:
This is negative if:
where
c L is the elasticity of college attendance with respect to c L : So, the derivative @b s @c L will be negative, except in those situations where the negative e¤ect of c L on college attendance is very large. To illustrate the condition above, we take the average values from Table 2 , where = 0:32; b s = 0:782; and the ratio c H =c L = 0; 61: The condition becomes " c L > 6:55: That is, the condition could only fail if the elasticity " c L is extremely large in absolute value. will be negative if " c H > 1. That is, we require either that c H has a positive e¤ect on college attendance or, if the e¤ect is negative, the size of this e¤ect cannot be very strong.
Slope of the iso-subsidies:
Using the elasticities of with respect to c L and c H as " c L = @ @c L c L and " c H = @ @c H c H , the slope of the iso-subsidy can be rewritten as:
where = c H =c L : First, suppose that both " c H and " c L are zero. Then the slope is:
The lower is b s the higher is the absolute value of this expression. That is, the lower is b s; the steeper are the iso-subsidies. Once we take into account the e¤ect of both " c L and " c H the result will hold as long as they are of small size, as we have discussed above.
Quasi-concavity of Q S
Consider a di¤erentiable function f (x) : R 2 ! R: A su¢ cient condition for quasiconcavity is: 
For the case of Q S we only need to assume the standard regularity conditions, namely:
That is, we require diminishing returns to both factors and a positive cross e¤ect.
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